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FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATION
Joseph E. Pattson *
On September 29, 1982, the United States signed bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) with the Arab Republic of Egypt' and the
Republic of Panama.2 These treaties represent a major deviation
from past United States trade policy. Traditionally, the United
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and Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities; J.D. 1977, Boston University.
The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of Mr. Pattison's clients or
his law firm.
1. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investments, Sept. 29, 1982, United States-Egypt, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 927 [hereinafter
cited as United States-Egypt BIT]. To date, neither the Egyptian Parliament nor the
United States Senate has ratified the treaty.
2. Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investment, Oct. 27, 1982,
United States-Panama, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1227 [hereinafter cited as United States-
Panama BIT]. The Panamanian Legislature has ratified the treaty. Telephone Interview
with Bruce Wilson, Office of the Trade Representative (Dec. 29, 1983) (confirming
ratification) [hereinafter cited as Wilson Telephone Interview]. The United States
Senate, however, still has not taken any action on the BIT.
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States refused to embrace the investment treaty concept,3 and instead
utilized the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty (FCN)
System to facilitate trade between itself and developing nations. The
treaties with Egypt and Panama signal the end of the "FCN era" and
mark the beginning of a new approach to bilateral economic
relations.4 Indeed, the United States recently signed BITs with Haiti
and Senegal and began BIT negotiations with a number of other
countries, including Argentina, China, El Salvador, Honduras,
Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia.5
Undoubtedly, the Egyptian and Panamanian treaties will serve
as prototypes for future investment agreements and will assume a
significance that extends far beyond the relations between the
signatories. 6 Because these treaties will establish the framework for
United States investment in developing countries for many years to
come, they merit close scrutiny. United States treaty negotiators
should identify the major benefits that such treaties provide to
United States companies and include them in future bilateral
3. In contrast, leading Western industrial nations have negotiated at least 175
bilateral investment treaties. See Asken, The Casefor Bilateral Investment Treaties, in
SYMPOSIUM FOR PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 357, 358 n.1 (1981).
4. These BITs resulted from an United States initiative in December 1981 aimed at
exploring new legal frameworks to nurture investment in developing countries. See
Barovick, BilateralInvestment Treaties, 5 Bus. AM. 3 (Aug. 3, 1982). That effort attracted
the interest of a number of foreign governments. In the first eight months after the
United States announced its intention to enter into BITs, 23 countries approached the
United States seeking to improve economic relations. Immediate negotiations began
with Egypt, Panama, and Antigua/Barbuda. Id As a result of all this activity, the
United States developed a BIT prototype which served as a model for the Egyptian and
Panamanian treaties. This prototype presented new challenges in the field of treaty
negotiations. It not only displayed the simplicity inherent in the BIT concept, but also
contained many of the basic BIT provisions utilized by Organization for Economic'
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. See infra note 22 and accompanying
text. As the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Investment Policy observed in 1982,
the United States was "charting new territories" which may present "an uphill battle" in
dealing with developing countries whose experiences with less comprehensive BITs
shaped their expectations with respect to their negotiations with the United States.
Barovick, supra, at 4.
5. U.S., China Will Launch Bilateral Treaty Negotiations, UST? Reports, U.S.
IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 338 (June 1, 1983); First U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty
Between U.S. and African Nation Signed, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 448 (Dec. 13,
1983); Wilson Telephone Interview, supra note 2 (confirming the signing of BIT between
the United States and Haiti).
See also Administration Announces Official on International Investment, U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) 851 (Sept. 13, 1983) (describing the Reagan administration's position on
international investment announced September 9, 1983).
6. The treaties complement the efforts of the Panamanian and Egyptian
governments to attract foreign capital to their countries. Through its "infitah" or open-
door policy, for example, Egypt has encouraged foreign investment. See generally
McLaughlin, Infitah in Egypt: An Appraisal of Egypt's Open-Door Policy for Foreign
Investment, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 885 (1978); Note, The Development of Foreign
Investment Law in Egypt and Its Effect on Private Foreign Investment, 10 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 301 (1980).
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investment agreements. Similarly, the negotiators should identify
any treaty provisions that are unfavorable to United States interests
and attempt to exclude them from subsequent agreements. By doing
this, the United States can develop a model treaty that provides
maximum protection to its overseas investments.7
This Article examines the evolution and current status of the
bilateral investment treaty concept as it relates to the United States.
First, it reviews the history and important characteristics of the FCN
and BIT systems. Second, it describes the United States-Egypt BIT
and analyzes its most important provisions.8 Third, it examines the
Treaty's deficiencies and recommends solutions. The Article
concludes that BITs will enhance the overseas investment
opportunities available to American investors and will provide better
investment security. The Article also notes, however, that BITs will
not solve all of the problems that United States investors encounter
abroad.
I
THE HISTORY OF THE FCN AND BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY SYSTEMS
A. THE FCN TREATY SYSTEM: AN AGING FRAMEWORK
To comprehend the importance of the bilateral investment
treaty, it is necessary to understand why the FCN treaty network
established by the United States has become obsolete. Currently, the
United States is a party to over forty FCN treaties.9 Although the
United States entered into a number of these in the 19th century, it
negotiated most of them, including those with both industrial trading
partners and developing countries, during the 1940's and 1950's.
They served as broad frameworks for general commercial rela-
tions.'0 But the United States signed the FCN treaties in a world
economic atmosphere that no longer exists-the post-war era when
Europe and Japan were forced to devote their funds to domestic
7. See Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, released by Office of Trade
Representative (January 1983) [hereinafter cited as Model or Model BIT].
8. In addition to examining the treaty the United States recently signed with Egypt,
this Article examines and makes frequent reference to the Model BIT released by the
Office of the Trade Representative in January 1983. See supra note 7. These frequent
references, however, should not detract from the importance of the United States-Egypt
BIT. This treaty has received substantial public attention and has evoked considerable
discussion about the efficacy of BITs.
9. See Asken, supra note 3, at 382-90 (listing FCN treaties currently in effect
between the United States and other nations).
10. For a discussion of the United States' experience with such treaties, see Walker,
Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United
States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956); Walker, Provisions on Companies in United
States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956).
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reconstruction and the United States had unparalleled sources of pri-
vate capital available for investment overseas. "
Typically, an FCN treaty contains broad provisions that deal
with issues such as commerce, foreign investment, travel, and indi-
vidual rights. 12 A signatory to such a treaty usually promises to pro-
tect property that is within its borders and is owned by nationals of
the other signatory.13 The substantive provisions of an FCN treaty
discuss:
(a) National treatment in the administration of local laws;
(b) Individual citizens' rights, such as freedom of movement and entry,
right to counsel and speedy trial, and protection from molestation;
(c) Private standing in national courts;
(d) The enforceability of arbitration awards between private parties;
(e) National treatment when engaging in and operating a business;
(f) The right freely to purchase and lease land;
(g) Protection of property;
(h) Protection of exchanges involving scientific and technical knowledge;
(i) Protection of property from unfair seizure in accordance with most-
favored-nation treatment;
(j) The rights of professionals to practice;
(k) Exchange controls;
(1) National and most-favored-nation treatment for patents and
trademarks;
(m) Rules on customs administration, import or export duties, and other
charges;
(n) Transportation of goods and services;
(o) National and most-favored-nation treatment in the areas of taxation
and products distribution and use;
(p) The right to compete with local monopolies;
(q) Freedom of commerce and navigation for ships;
(r) Bilateral consultation regarding competitive restraint practices; and
(s) Dispute settlement between the treaty signatories. 14
The FCN treaties thus focus on the protection of individual
rights as well as, in a general way, the promotion of business
between the United States and other nations. They strongly empha-
size "friendship" rather than funds transfers, expropriation, dispute
settlement, or other contemporary international business problems.
11. Between 1946 and 1959, for example, the United States' overseas investment
increased from $7.2 billion to $29.7 billion. See Jova, Private Investment in Latin
America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 10 TEx. INT'L L.J. 455 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United
States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as United States-Japan
FCN Treaty].
13. See, eg., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 12, 1959,
United States-Pakistan, art. 1, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683 [hereinafter cited as
United States-Pakistan FCN Treaty].
14. See, e.g., United States-Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 12; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 7, 1957, United States-Korea, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3947; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 30, 1961, United States-
Denmark, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4749.
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Because the FCN treaties fail to deal adequately with these impor-
tant subject areas, a need exists for a more business-oriented agree-
ment. The BIT attempts to accomplish this goal. The BIT also
addresses a number of other problems that plague the FCN treaty
system. First, the formal and sweeping nature of FCN treaties may
cause developing countries to be reluctant to enter into such agree-
ments. These nations may perceive that an FCN treaty aligns them
politically with the United States when in fact they desire to remain
non-aligned. The BIT cures this problem because it focuses exclu-
sively on economic matters. Second, the substantial monetary losses
incurred in recent years by United States businesses as a result of
expropriations in Iran, Libya, and other nations have demonstrated
the inability of the current treaty system to protect America's over-
seas investments.' 5 A BIT, on the other hand, usually provides for
both specific conditions under which expropriation can occur and
15. In the early 1970's, the Libyan government expropriated foreign owned oil com-
panies doing business in Libya. Victims of the expropriations complained bitterly that
this action discriminated against them, lacked a valid public purpose, and failed to pro-
vide adequate compensation. In regard to the expropriation of the assets belonging to
Nelson Bunker Hunt Oil Company, an American company, President Nixon stated:
Under International law, the United States has a right to expect:
-that any taking of American private property will be nondiscriminatory;
-that it will be for a public purpose;
-that its citizens will receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation
from the expropriating country.
Economic Assistance and Investment Security in Developing Nations, Policy Statement 8
WEEKLY COMP. PR.s. Doc. 64, 65 (Jan. 19, 1972). In addition, the U.S. State Depart-
ment made formal protests to the Libyan government:
It is clear. . . that the reasons for the action of the Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic against the rights and property of the Nelson Bunker Hunt Oil
Company were political reprisal against the United States Government and coer-
cion against the economic interests of certain other United States nationals in
Libya.
Under established principles of international law, measures taken against the
rights and property of foreign nationals which are arbitrary, discriminatory, or
based on considerations of political reprisal and economic coercion are invalid
and not entitled to recognition by other states.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1973, at 55, col. 2. Although many of the victims of the Libyan
expropriations did eventually settle their claims against Libya, the dispute resolution pro-
cedure clearly did not function smoothly. See Fisher, Golbert & Maghame, British
Petroleum v. Libya: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the International Oil Compa-
nies' Response to Nationalization, 7 Sw. U.L. Rv. 68 (1975).
In the wake of the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the new Islamic government of that
nation nationalized certain foreign-owned industries. These actions led more than 400
parties, mostly United States corporations, to file suit in United States courts against
Iran's government. The plaintiffs claimed that the expropriatory actions violated the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights signed by Iran and the
United States in 1955. See Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights,
Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 (This treaty was an
FCN treaty and was typical of the type of agreements entered into by the United States
in the late 1940s and 1950s.). Specifically, they alleged that Iran failed to pay prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation. To date, the victims of the expropriatory actions
have not been fully compensated.
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prompt and adequate compensation. 16 These facts, combined with
the political instability in many developing countries, the extensive
use of BITs by other industrial nations, the occasional criticism in
the United Nations by developing nations of foreign investors, and
the evolution of a specialized multilateral trading framework under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), indicate that
the FCN treaty system has outlived its usefulness as a vehicle to
facilitate international trade. In conclusion, it is clear that FCN
treaties are too complex and too broadly phrased to foster and pro-
tect adequately overseas investments.
B. THE CONCEPT OF THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY:
RECIPROCAL OPPORTUNITY
Many Western industrial nations have successfully employed
BITs for a number of years. 17 Indeed, Japan is the only United
16. In regard to expropriation, the United States-Egypt BIT states:
(I) No investment or any part of an investment of a national or a company of
either Party shall be expropriated or nationalized by the other Party or a political
or administrative subdivision thereof-or subjected to any other measure, direct
or indirect (including, for example, the levying of taxation, the compulsory sale
of all or part of such an investment, or impairment or deprivation of manage-
ment, control or economic value of such an investment by the national or com-
pany concerned), if the effect of such other measure, or a series of such other
measures, would be tantamount to expropriation or nationalization (all expropri-
ations, all nationalizations and all such other measures hereinafter referred to as
"expropriation")-unless the expropriation
(a) is done for a public purpose;
(b) is accomplished under due process of law;
(c) is not discriminatory;
(d) is accompanied by prompt and adequate compensation, freely realizable;
and
(e) does not violate any specific provision on contractual stability or expro-
priation contained in an investment agreement between the national or
company concerned and the Party making the expropriation.
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment on the date of expropriation. The calculation of such compensation
shall not reflect any reduction in such fair market value due to either prior public
notice or announcement of the expropriatory action, or the occurence of the
events that constituted or resulted in the expropriatory action. Such compensa-
tion shall include payments for delay as may be considered appropriate under
international law, and shall be freely transferable at the prevailing rate of
exchange for current transactions on the date of the expropriatory actions.
(2) If either Party or a political or administrative subdivision thereof expropri-
ates the investment of any company duly incorporated, constituted or otherwise
duly organized in its territory, and if nationals or companies of the other Party,
directly or indirectly, own, hold or have other rights with respect to the equity of
such company, then the Party within whose territory the expropriation occurs
shall ensure that such nationals or companies of the other Party receive compen-
sation in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. III, para. 1 & 2.
17. A number of international organizations have attempted to improve the BIT sys-
tem. As a result, many multilateral discussions regarding BITs have taken place. In
addition, many organizations have published BIT guidelines. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL
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States trading partner that has used FCN treaties in its relations with
developing nations.' 8 Although the BITs used by the United States'
trading partners vary from relatively abbreviated instruments, such
as those utilized recently by the United Kingdom, 19 to long and com-
plex documents, 20 the goal of any BIT is to facilitate trade between
the signatories.
A fundamental feature of BITs is that they focus upon the eco-
nomic relations between industrial and developing nations rather
than the relations among industrial nations. Multilateral agree-
ments, such as the Treaty of Rome 2' and the Code of Liberalization
of Capital Movements of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD),22 on the other hand, typically gov-
ern the economic relations among industrial nations.23
The preamble of a BIT typically reflects the general spirit and
intent of the treaty. Japan and Sri Lanka, for example, recently
signed a BIT that contains such a statement.24 In it, the parties
enunciated their
(i) desire to strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries;
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 272, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
(1972). The BIT has been frequently employed by United States allies. West Germany,
for example, has entered into approximately 50 such treaties, Switzerland has entered
into 33, and the Netherlands has entered into 16. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, PUB. No. 266, at 7, BILATERAL TREATIES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
(2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE].
18. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 17, at 8.
19. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Feb. 13, 1980, Sri
Lanka-United Kingdom, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 886 [hereinafter cited as Sri Lanka-
United Kingdom BIT]. See also, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Dec. 3, 1980, Philippines-United Kingdom, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 326 (a
simple, short, concise document) [hereinafter cited as Philippines-United Kingdom BIT].
20. Compare, e.g., Philippines-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19 (a simple, short,
concise document) with Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ment, Mar. 1, 1982, Japan-Sri Lanka, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 963 [hereinafter cited as
Japan-Sri Lanka BIT].
21. The Treaty of Rome, for example, provides that member states should remove
obstacles that prevent the free movement of persons, services and capital. Treaty of
Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
22. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE ON
LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, PUB. No. 21-82-041 (Mar. 1982).
23. Although the stark distinctions between some developing nations and the OECD
nations have begun to erode as the economies of the former countries have begun to
mature, those distinctions remain sufficiently strong to justify the use of bilateral invest-
ment treaties by OECD nations to enhance their economic relations with developing
nations. In contrast to multinational agreements designed for complex commercial
regimes dominated by companies with multinational bases, BITs provide a streamlined,
adaptable framework for commercial relations between developing and industrialized
nations. This framework more than adequately meets the needs of the comparatively
simple, and often homogenous, economies of developing nations.
24. Japan-Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 20.
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(ii) intent to create favorable investment conditions for each signatory's
citizens and companies doing business and investing within the other
signatory's borders; and
(iii) recognition that the promotion and protection of investment will stim-
ulate the flow of capital and technology between the signatories and
that the economies of the signatories will benefit as a result of the
flow. 2
5
Clearly, the spirit of this treaty is one of cooperation.
In contrast to the typical FCN treaty entered into by the United
States, a BIT is a concise instrument that addresses the economic
concerns of the signatories.26 Such a treaty typically has only a few
substantive provisions. In its simplest form, a BIT establishes a stan-
dard for the reciprocal treatment of foreign investment,27 provides
for the compensation of certain investment losses such as expropria-
tions, 28 and establishes standards for the repatriation of capital and
25. Id at preamble.
26. A BIT's basic premises are that both parties to the treaty benefit when the nation-
als and companies of one signatory invest in the economy of the other and that this type
of activity should be promoted and protected. Usually, overly complex and unwieldy
agreements govern the relations between nations. BITs, however, have a unique place in
international economic relations in that they are simple and functional instruments. The
United Nations compared the BIT concept with the broader FCN approaches and noted
that
[t]he increasing resort to such bilateral investment agreements, which can be
readily adapted to the particular conditions and relations of the contracting
countries and are frequently co-ordinated with actual investment projects, may
point to a more promising process for evolving a new system of workable inter-
national law on which investors may rely.
U.N. ESCOR at 108, U.N. Doc. E/4446 (1968).
27. See, for example, the United States-Egypt BIT's articulation of the most-favored-
nation principle, infra text accompanying note 37. Compare with Model BIT, supra note
7, at art. II, para. 1.
28. See, e.g., United States-Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. III (providing conditions
under which expropriation can occur and providing a compensation formula); id at art.
IV (providing compensation for damages due to war and similar events). See also Model
BIT, supra note 7, at art. III; id at art. IV.
Because of the importance expropriations have played in international relations in
recent years, the Model BIT's and the United States-Egypt BIT's treatment of expropria-
tion merit study and comparison. Such a study reveals three differences. First, the
United States-Egypt BIT covers expropriations and nationalizations by both the signa-
tory and its political and administrative subdivisions. The Model BIT only covers expro-
priations by the signatory. Second, the United States-Egypt BIT provides that the fair
market value of the expropriated investment should be measured as of the date of expro-
priation. The Model BIT, however, does not indicate when the fair market value of the
expropriated investment should be measured. Third, the United States-Egypt BIT states
that the compensation for expropriated investments "shall include payments for delay as
may be considered appropriate under international law . . . ." United States-Egypt
BIT, supra note 1, at art. III, para. 1. The Model BIT, on the other hand, treats this
subject with substantially more specificity. It states that "[s]uch compensation shall be
paid without delay, shall be effectively realizable, [and] shall bear current interest from
the date of expropriation at a rate equivalent to current international rates." Model BIT,
supra note 7, at art. III, para. 1.
War damage compensation also has received considerable attention in recent years. A
comparison of the Model BIT's and the United States-Egypt BIT's treatment of war
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profits.2 9 To clarify these provisions and to make them workable, a
BIT also contains ancillary provisions dealing with subjects such as
dispute resolution procedures.30
damages reveals two significant differences. First, the United States-Egypt treaty covers
damages due to war between a signatory and a third country and "damages due to any
kind of civil disturbance or insurrection in the territory" of a signatory. United States-
Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. IV. The Model also covers damages arising from war
between a signatory and a third country. Compared to the United States-Egypt BIT,
however, it better defines the types of internal events that can lead to compensation. The
Model states that a signatory can be compensated for "damages due to revolution, state
of national emergency, revolt, insurrection, riot or act of terrorism in the territory" of the
other signatory. Model BIT, sMpra note 7, at art. IV, para. I. In addition, the Model
provides:
In the event that such damages result from:
(a) a requisitioning of property by the other Party's forces or authorities, or
(b) destruction of property by the other Party's forces or authorities which was
not caused in combat action or was not required by the necessity of the
situation,
the national or company shall be accorded restitution or compensation consistent
with Article III.
Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. IV, para. II. The United States-Egypt BIT contains no
such provision.
29. The United States-Egypt BIT states:
Either Party shall in respect to investments by nationals or companies of the
other Party grant to those nationals or companies the free transfer of:
a. returns.
b. royalties and other payments deriving from licenses, franchises and other
similar grants or rights.
c. installments in repayment of loans.
d. amounts spent for the management of the investment in the territory of
the other Party or a third country.
e. additional funds necessary for the maintenance of the investment.
f. the proceeds of partial or total sale or liquidation of the investment,
including a liquidation effected as a result of any event mentioned in Arti-
cle IV; and
g. compensation payments pursuant to Article III.
United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 1.
The Model BIT's treatment of this subject is slightly different. It states that
[e]ach Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment in its territory of
a national or company of the other Party to be made freely and without delay
into and out of its territory. Such transfers include the following: returns; com-
pensation; payments made arising out of a dispute concerning an investment;
payments made under a contract, including amortization of principal and
accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan agreement; amounts to cover
expenses relating to the management of the investment; royalties and other pay-
ments derived from licenses, franchises or other grants of rights or from adminis-
trative or technical assistance agreements, including management fees; proceeds
from the sale of all or any part of an investment and from the partial or complete
liquidation of the company concerned, including any incremental value; addi-
tional contributions to capital necessary or appropriate for the maintenance or
development of an investment.
Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. V, para. 1.
30. See, e.g., United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. IV (providing for biennial
consultations and exchange of information); id. at art. VII (providing for settlement of
investment disputes between one party and a national or company of the other party); id.
at art. VIII (providing for settlement of disputes between the parties concerning interpre-
tation or application of the Treaty).
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A BIT's true test of efficiency is, of course, its ability to provide
security to investors when they invest overseas. European countries
that have entered into BITs with developing nations have indeed
found their investments protected from certain expropriatory
actions. In two reported cases, for example, German interests were
given protection based upon BIT provisions. 31 In one of these cases,
after formal German protests, a developing country refrained from
expropriating the property of German investors because of protec-
tions provided by a BIT.32 In the other case, the developing nation
refrained from expropriating German properties, but expropriated
the property owned by other foreigners.3 3
II
AN EXAMINATION OF THE BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY AS USED BY
THE UNITED STATES AND
EGYPT
Bilateral investment treaties are an important way to improve
economic relations between industrialized and developing nations.
When examining the relationship of this type of treaty to United
States foreign investment policy, one must necessarily examine the
United States-Egypt BIT. Although the United States has adopted a
prototype treaty and has signed bilateral investment agreements with
Panama, Haiti, and Senegal, only the treaty between the United
States and Egypt has received substantial public attention. Thus, in
many ways, this treaty is the only true model.34 This section of the
Article reviews the United States-Egypt BIT's most important provi-
sions. Upon completing this review, the reader should be more able
to appreciate the BIT and its impact on the United States' economic
relations with developing countries.
A. PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF INVESTMENT
The focus of any BIT is the mutual protection of investments in
the "contracting states". 35 The basic standard of protection is gener-
ally the most-favored-nation standard. As part of its basic commit-
31. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 17, at 10.
32. Id
33. Id
34. See supra note 8.
35. See, e.g., Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 29, 1982,
People's Republic of China-Sweden, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 477 [hereinafter cited as
Mutual Protection Treaty]. That treaty expresses the spirit of such a covenant in typical
fashion by stating that "[e]ach Contracting State shall at all times ensure fair and equita-
ble treatment to the investments by investors of the other Contracting State." Id at art.
2, para. 1.
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ment to create a "favorable environment" for investment, Article II
of the BIT between the United States and Egypt36 incorporates this
standard:
Each party undertakes to provide and maintain a favorable environment for
investments in its territory by nationals and companies of the other Party and
shall, in applying its laws, regulations, administrative practices and proce-
dures, permit such investments to be established and acquired on terms and
conditions that accord treatment no less favorable than the treatment it
accords to investments of its own nationals or companies or to nationals and
companies of any third country, whichever is the most favorable.
37
This provision reflects an expanded most-favored-nation commit-
ment because it treats the contracting parties the same as most-
favored third country investors and domestic investors.38
Significantly, treaty negotiators deleted from the final version of
the United States-Egypt BIT a related provision that had been
included in early drafts of that treaty. The deleted provision stated:
Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory meas-
ures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition,
expansion or disposal of investment made by nationals or companies of the
36. As noted previously, this Article focuses on the BIT signed by the United States
and Egypt. This treaty resembles in principle and in scope the treaty the United States
signed with Panama. The United States-Egypt BIT, however, has received substantial
notoriety in international commercial circles. As a result, many foreign negotiators have
viewed this treaty as the prototype BIT. In its talks with other countries, however, the
Office of the United States Trade Representative has utilized a prototype that it promul-
gated specifically for use by treaty negotiators as a reference tool. It released the current
version of the prototype in January 1983. See supra note 7.
37. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 1. Close scrutiny reveals
that this provision deals only with the most-favored-nation standard as it relates to the
establishment or acquisition of investments. It makes no mention of the standard of
protection afforded to the investing party after it acquires or establishes an investment
within the borders of the other signatory. The second paragraph of the Treaty's second
article, however, deals with this subject. It states that:
Each Party shall accord investments in its territory, and associate activities
related to these investments, of nationals or companies of the other Party treat-
ment no less favorable than that which it accords in like situations to investments
and associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or nationals or com-
panies of any third country, whichever is the most favorable.
Id at art. II, para. 2(a).
As used in the above treaty excerpt, a "company of a party" means "a company incor-
porated, constituted, or otherwise duly organized under the applicable laws and regula-
tions of a Party... in which natural persons who are nationals of such Party" or "such
Party or its political or administrative subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities have a
substantial interest." Id at art. I, para. l(b).
38. "National treatment" occurs when a nation gives foreign investors the same
rights and privileges with respect to investments that it affords to its own nationals. Such
treatment is one of the most significant features of a BIT. Inclusion of this standard in
the United States-Egypt BIT represents an important commitment by the United States
to expand protection beyond the terms of many existing OECD investment treaties.
Early investment treaties of other nations often included only a provision dealing with
most-favored-nation treatment. In recent years, however, a national treatment standard
has been incorporated into most BIT agreements negotiated by OECD nations. See, e.g.,
Japan-Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 20, at art. 3. But see Philippines-United Kingdom BIT,
supra note 19, at art. 4 (only providing most-favored-nation treatment).
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other Party.
39
Deletion of this language may not weaken the most-favored-nation
standard or the national treatment protections because the provision
simply underscored those protections. The deleted language, how-
ever, would have effectively prohibited indirect impairment of rights
created by the BIT.4° Without the provision, both the United States
and the Egyptian governments can impair investments by actions
falling short of explicit expropriation or of overt acts prohibited by
the formal protections of Article II.41 Indeed, perhaps the purpose
of the deleted language was to prevent subtle, indirect discrimina-
tion, because this type of behavior is usually more prevalent than
overt departures from the most-favored-nation standard or national
treatment. 42 Although no treaty provision can effectively eliminate
all possible "arbitrary and discriminatory measures," the deleted
language was of value not only as an expression of the parties' com-
mitment to avoid such measures, but also as a basis for protesting
them under treaty dispute procedures. Thus, this language serves
the interests of United States investors and should be included in
future BITs.
I Investment and 'ssociated" Activities
The ,United States-Egypt BIT protects a broad spectrum of
investmets. It states that the term "investment" includes all
"equity, debt, service and investment contracts" and provides a non-
exclusive list of these protected investments. 43 In addition, the
Treaty extends the scope of protected conduct to so-called "associ-
39. The United States-Panama BIT contains a similar provision. See United States-
Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. II, para. 2.
40. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
41. The non-tariff barrier negotiations held under the GATT, for example, reflect
that the number of subtle, indirect modes of discrimination against foreign investors is
virtually limitless. The distortions in international commerce caused by border tax
adjustments, arbitrary import licensing, qualitative import restrictions, unreasonable
technical standards, and discriminatory use of "safeguard" provisions to achieve tempo-
rary import relief have been well documented. See R. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTOR-
TIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1970). Although the Tokyo Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations held under GATT from 1973 to 1979 achieved significant progress in
resolving these problems through the Agreement on Government Procurement, Agree-
ment on Framework on Conduct of International Trade, Agreement on Technical Stan-
dards, and Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, many indirect acts of
discrimination against foreign investors still exist. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SELECTED IMPEDIMENTS TO TRADE IN SERVICES
(1982).
42. See infra note 153.
43. The following investments are included in this list:
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens
and pledges;
(ii) a company or shares of stock in a company or interests in the assets
thereof;
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ated" activities. Examining the sample list of these activities pro-
vided in the Treaty,44 it becomes clear that they consist of the
primary business activities appurtenant to any investment. As the
provisions just described indicate, the United States-Egypt BIT pro-
tects substantially more investment-related activities than do most
investment treaties. Usually, such treaties contain only a short and
equivocal definition of protected investments.45
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value due
under an investment agreement;
(iv) valid intellectual and industrial property rights, including, but not limited
to, rights with respect to copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade names,
industrial designs, trade secrets, and know-how, and goodwill;
(v) licenses and permits issued pursuant to law, including those issued for
manufacture and sale of products;
(vi) any right conferred by law or contract including, but not limited to, rights,
within the confines of law, to search for or utilize natural resources, and
rights to manufacture, use and sell products;
(vii) returns which are reinvested.
United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. I, para. l(c). See also Model BIT, supra
note 7, at art. I, para. l(c).
See United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 1(f) (defining return as "an
amount derived from an investment, including but not limited to, profit; dividend; inter-
est; royalty payment; management, technical assistance or other fee; and payment in
kind"); Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. I, para. 1(c).
44. Sample "associated activities" include:
(i) the establishment, control and maintenance of branches, agencies, offices,
factories or other facilities for the conduct of business;
(ii) the organization of companies under applicable laws and regulations; the
acquisition of companies or interests in companies or in their property;
and the management, control, maintenance, use, enjoyment and expan-
sion, and the sale, liquidation, dissolution or other disposition, of compa-
nies organized or acquired;
(iii) the making, performance and enforcement of contracts related to
investment;
(iv) the acquisition (whether by purchase, lease or any other legal means),
ownership and disposition (whether by sale, testament or any other legal
means) of personal property of all kinds, both tangible and intangible;
(v) the leasing of real property appropriate for the conduct of business;
(vi) the acquisition, maintenance and protection of copyrights, patents, trade-
marks, trade secrets, trade names, licenses and other approvals of products
and manufacturing processes, and other industrial property rights; and,
(vii) the borrowing of funds at market terms and conditions from local
financial institutions, as well as the purchase and issuance of equity shares
in the local financial markets, and, in accordance with national regulations
and practices, the purchase of foreign exchange for the operation of the
enterprise.
United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 2.
45. The BIT between the Philippines and the United Kingdom, for example, pro-
vides in pertinent part:
The term 'investment' shall mean every kind of asset and in particular, though
not exclusively, includes:
(i) movable and immovable property and any other property rights such as
mortgages, liens and pledges;
(ii) shares, stocks and debentures of companies or interests in the property
of such companies;
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2. Reservation of Limited Industry Sectors
Protections under the United States-Egypt BIT extend to invest-
ments and associated activities that occurred before the treaty took
effect.46 Significantly, the Treaty permits the contracting parties to
except a limited group of industries from the standard of national
treatment. These exceptions encompass industries of strategic or
other special importance to the parties.47 Thus, in an annex to the
United States-Egypt BIT, both parties reserved the right to maintain
limited exceptions in commercial areas such as air transportation,
maritime shipping, banking, insurance, land use, ownership of real
estate, natural resource use, radio and television broadcasting, tele-
communications, and custom brokering. 48 Moreover, Egypt
reserved exceptions in areas such as distribution, wholesaling, retail-
ing, importing, and exporting.49 These exceptions, which are much
(iii) claims to money or to any performance under contract having financial
value;
(iv) intellectual property rights and goodwill;
(v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract.
Philippines-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. I, para. 5.
46. Retroactive application occurs if it "is not inconsistent with agreements, contrac-
tual arrangements, investment authorizations and licenses made under legislation
existing at the time the concerned investments were made." United States-Egypt BIT,
supra note 1, at art. II, para. 2(b).
47. Id at art. II, para. 3. Traditionally, industries that have been accorded such
protection have included: (1) industries dealing in nonrenewable natural resources and
(2) industries playing a vital role in national security.
48. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 3 (referring to the Treaty's
Annex which lists specific exceptions). See also Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. II, para.
3(a).
49. Under the United States-Egypt BIT's Annex, the United States reserves the right
to maintain limited exceptions for the following:
Air transportation, ocean and coastal shipping; banking; insurance, govern-
ment grants; government insurance and loan programs; energy and power pro-
duction; use of land and natural resources, custom house brokers; ownership of
real estate; radio and television broadcasting; telephone and telegraph services,
submarine cable services; satellite communications.
United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1 at Annex.
Egypt, on the other hand, specifically reserves the right to maintain exceptions for the
following:
Air and sea transportation; maritime agencies; land transportation other than
that of tourism; mail telecommunication, telegraph services and other public
services which are state monopolies; banking and insurance; commercial activity
such as distribution, wholesaling, retailing, important export activities; commer-
cial agency and broker activities; ownership of real estate; use of land, natural
resources; national loans; radio, television and the issuance of newspapers and
magazines.
Id With regard to the "commercial activity" exception listed by Egypt, the parties noted
that the term does not include "integrated operations which combine production and
sales activities for their products." Id at Protocol, para. 7. The parties further agreed
that these exceptions do not apply to investment banking, merchant banking, and rein-
surance companies whose activities are confined to foreign currency transactions. Id at
Protocol, para. 8.
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broader than those appearing in other BITs,50 are not retroactive.5 1
Further, they cannot result in treatment that is less favorable than
that accorded to investments and associated activities of nationals or
companies of any third country.5 2 Consequently, the exceptions
only apply to the standard of national treatment and do not in any
way weaken the most-favored-nation treatment of investments.
Despite the exceptions, the Treaty assures that the "treatment, pro-
tection and security of investments shall never be less than that
required by international law and national legislation." 53
The "limited exception" provisions of the United States-Egypt
BIT54 may be the most significant departure from the practices of
other OECD countries, and they pose a potentially dangerous prece-
dent for future United States investment agreements. Although the
provisions exclude only national treatment protection, the scope of
industries reserved by the parties creates a substantial void in the
Treaty. This void undermines uniform and comprehensive invest-
ment protection. Additionally, the need for or viability of exceptions
in several of the listed industry sectors is tenuous when viewed
against the background of applicable laws and economic realities. 55
3. Immigration and Labor
To encourage investment, the United States-Egypt BIT permits
the nationals of a contracting party to enter and remain in the other
party's territory to direct investment activity 56 These nationals,
however, are "subject to the [host nation's] laws relating to the entry
and sojourn of aliens." 57 The BIT provides that
nationals of either Party shall be permitted to enter and to remain in the
territory of the other Party for the purpose of establishing, developing,
directing, administering or advising on the operations of an investment to
which they or the companies that employ them have committed or are in the
process of committing a substantial amount of capital or other resources.
58
50. The Japan-Sri Lanka BIT, for example, excludes only certain matters concerning
banking, shipping, and aviation. These exclusions apply only to the national treatment.
Japan-Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 20, at art. 3, para. 3. Exception clauses in many con-
temporary treaties exclude only preferences or privileges resulting from customs union
and tax agreements. See, e.g., Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Sept. 23, 1981, Sri Lanka-Switzerland, art. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 399;
Philippines-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. IV, para. 3.
51. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 3.
52. Id at art. II, para. 3.
53. Id at art. II, para. 4.
54. See id at art. II, para. 3; id at Annex.
55. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
56. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 5(a).
57. Id
58. Id
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Concomitantly, the Treaty permits nationals or companies of the
contracting parties and companies owned and controlled by the par-
ties to choose the individuals who will manage their investments.59
This provision protects against the common demand of developing
countries that their nationals manage foreign owned investments and
businesses within their borders. Additionally, subject to the employ-
ment laws of the parties, nationals and companies of either party
may engage "professional and technical personnel of their choice for
the particular purpose of rendering professional, technical and man-
agerial assistance necessary for the planning and operation of invest-
ment." 60 Finally, the BIT guarantees that nationals and companies
of the parties may employ persons of their choice "who otherwise
qualify under applicable laws and regulations of the forum."'61
At first glance, the United States-Egypt BIT's employment pro-
visions appear quite liberal because they make hiring only "subject
to [the] employment laws of each party."62 These provisions, how-
ever, may establish a limitation more severe than that imposed by
FCN treaties.63 In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 64 the
Supreme Court held that a provision in an FCN treaty between the
United States and Japan did not insulate an American subsidiary of
a Japanese company from a suit alleging employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.65 Sumitomo, how-
59. Id at para. 5(b).
60. Id
61. Id at para. 8.
62. Id at para. 5(b).
63. FCN treaties typically state that "companies of either [p]arty shall be permitted
to engage within the territories of the other party, accountants and other technical
experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice." See,
e.g., United States-Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 12, at art. VIII, para. 1.
64. 457 U.S. 176 (1982). In Sumitomo, a class action was brought on behalf of the
past and present female secretarial staff of a United States subsidiary of a Japanese com-
pany. The plaintiffs claimed that the corporation's practice of hiring male Japanese citi-
zens violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 178. The subsidiary defended itself by
claiming protection under the United States-Japan FCN Treaty. Id at 179. See United
States-Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 12. The relevant provision states:
[Companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of
the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel,
attorneys, agents, and other specialists of their choice.
Id at art. VIII, para. 1. The Treaty goes on to define "companies" as follows:
As used in the present treaty, the term "companies" means corporations, partner-
ships, companies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability and
whether or not for pecuniary profit. Companies constituted under applicable
laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed com-
panies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized within territories
of the other Party.
Id at art. XXII, para. 3.
65. The subsidiary was incorporated in New York. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 178.
Thus, it was a United States company, not a Japanese company. Relying on this fact, the
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ever, does not limit the broad employment rights of a bona fide for-
eign company of an FCN treaty nation operating in the United
States.66 Moreover, it does not address whether such treaty provi-
sions could be modified or superseded by national employment
laws. 67
4. Competitive Equality
The protections afforded by a BIT should extend to competition
between enterprises run by the host government and companies or
nationals of the other party. Consequently, "[in the context of
national economic policies and the desire to promote investments of
all types, both private and public," the United States and Egypt
agreed to extend protections to such competition.68 The two nations
agreed that:
[e]onditions of competitive equality should be maintained where investments
owned or controlled by a Party or its agencies or instrumentalities, within the
territory of such Party, are in competition under similar conditions and situa-
tions with privately owned or controlled investments of nationals or compa-
nies of the other Party.69
To ensure competitive equality, the United States-Egypt BIT
seeks to prevent the misuse of national performance requirements. 70
Previously, nations have applied such requirements inequitably so as
to restrict trade and investment.7' According to the BIT's terms,
however, the United States and Egypt must "seek to avoid the impo-
sition of performance requirements on the investments of nationals
and companies of the other Party."72
Sumitomo Court held that the FCN provision did not apply to a foreign subsidiary
incorporated in the United States in a Title VII employment discrimination suit.
Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189.
66. In Sumitomo, the Court indicated that each FCN must be interpreted in light of
its negotiation history and that, in the case at hand, the contracting parties clearly
intended to exclude United States subsidiary corporations from the treaty's coverage.
Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 187-88. This view limits the application of Sumitomo to situa-
tions involving treaties with similar negotiation histories.
67. The Court noted that the question whether the Treaty's provision regarding the
employment of Japanese nationals violated Title VII was "not properly before the court"
for procedural reasons. Id at 180 n.4.
68. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 6.
69. Id at art. II, para. 6. The Model BIT uses similar language. It states that "[i]n
such situations, the privately owned or controlled investments shall receive treatment
which is equivalent with regard to any special economic advantage accorded the govern-
mentally owned or controlled investments." Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. II, para. 6.
70. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 7.
71. See generally S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 381 (discussing nontariff barriers that have become national per-
formance requirements).
72. U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 7.
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5. Access to Adjudicatory Process and Transparency of Laws
A requirement that the contracting parties provide "effective
means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to invest-
ment agreements, investment authorizations, and properties" 73 is one
of the United States-Egypt BIT's more important features. To this
end, the Treaty requires that the parties make access to the appropri-
ate adjudicatory bodies available to nationals or companies of the
other party.74 Thus, the Treaty provides that each contracting party
must grant a "right of access to its courts of justice, administrative
tribunals and agencies, and all other bodies exercising adjudicatory
authority, '75 so that investment-related claims and rights can be
asserted and enforced.76
The contracting parties' access to legal process is augmented
further by a requirement that each party make public its applicable
legal requirements.77 This clause seeks to avoid the inequitable
application of laws to a foreign party who may be ignorant of
them.78
73. Id at para. 8.
74. Id
75. Id
76. Under long established legal principles, nations can grant foreigners access to
their courts. The territorial principle allows each party to impose its laws on the inves-
tors of the other party. Thereby, a nation can exercise judicial, legislative, or enforce-
ment jurisdiction over all persons or things within its borders. In discussing this
principle, Chief Justice John Marshall stated:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restric-
tions upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminu-
tion of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that
sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction,
all exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its
territories, must be traced to the consent of the nation itself.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
77. See United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 9. Under this
provision,
[ejach Party and its political or administrative subdivisions shall make public
all laws, regulations, administrative practices and procedures, and adjudicatory
decisions that pertain to or affect investments in its territory of nationals or com-
panies of the other Party.
Id
This disclosure is important because in many nations non-public laws dealing with sub-
jects such as product standards, procurement, and general commercial activity have cre-
ated a formidable trade barrier. Exporters whose products fail to comply with technical
standards and to pass customs inspections have often been frustrated in their attempts to
obtain such standards for two reasons: (1) vast bureaucratic obstacles and (2) the failure
of many nations to publicize their standards.
78. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 9.
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B. EXPROPRIATION 79
Investment treaties historically have established specific stan-
dards for expropriation or nationalization of investments, the threat
of which is always of major concern to investors.80 The model BIT
incorporates such a standard and includes assurances of due process
and non-discriminatory treatment8' similar to those within recent
OECD BITs. 82 The United States-Egypt BIT specifically provides
that no portion of an investment made by a national or company of a
signatory shall be expropriated unless the expropriation
(a) is done for a public purpose;
(b) is accomplished under due process of law;
(c) is not discriminatory;
(d) is accompanied by prompt and adequate compensation, freely realiza-
ble; and
(e) does not violate any specific provision on contractual stability or expro-
priation contained in an investment agreement between the national or
company concerned and the Party making the expropriation.
83
In this context, "expropriation" includes not only all expropriations
and nationalizations, but also "the levying of [taxes], the compulsory
sale of all or part of such an investment, [the] impairment or depri-
vation of management, control or economic value of such an invest-
ment" and other direct or indirect measures by a signatory or its
political or administrative subdivisions which, in effect, are tanta-
mount to expropriation or nationalization.84
The prompt, adequate, and "freely realizable" compensation for
expropriated property mandated by the United States-Egypt BIT
must be equivalent to the fair market value of the investment on the
79. See generally supra note 28.
80. See, e.g., United States-Pakistan FCN Treaty, supra note 13. That treaty states:
Property of nationals and companies of either Party shall not be taken within
the territories of the other Party except for a public purpose, nor shall it be taken
without the prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be
in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of the
property taken; and adequate provision shall have been made at or prior to the
time of taking for the determination and payment thereof.
Id at art. VI, para. 4. Provisions similar to the one quoted above can be found in a
number of other treaties. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Mar. 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, art. VI, para. 4, 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2051, T.I.A.S.
No. 3942; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-
Federal Republic of Germany, art. V, para. 4, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1840, T.I.A.S. No. 3593;
United States-Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 12, at art. VI, para. 4; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United States-Israel, art. VI, para. 4, 5 U.S.T.
550, 556, T.I.A.S. No. 551; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3,
1951, United States-Greece, art. VII, para. 3, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 3057.
81. Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. III, para. 1.
82. See, e.g., Japan-Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 20, at art. 5, para. 2.
83. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. III, para. 1.
84. Id
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date of expropriation.85 Significantly, this amount is not to be
reduced because of a prior public announcement of the
expropriatory action or because of the occurrence of events leading
to the expropriation. 6 Moreover, it must include interest or "other
payments for delay" deemed appropriate under international law
and must be freely transferable at the prevailing exchange rate.87
In cases of alleged expropriation, the United States-Egypt BIT
grants each party's nationals and companies a right to prompt review
"by the appropriate judicial or administrative authorities. ' 88 Such
authorities will determine whether expropriation has actually
occurred, and if so, whether it and any attendant compensation con-
form to the treaty standards.8 9
C. COMPENSATION FOR WAR DAMAGES
The United States-Egypt BIT, like many modern bilateral
agreements, explicitly provides for losses incurred due to war, civil
disturbance, and other types of violent conflict.90 Specifically, the
treaty applies the dual standards of most-favored-nation and
national treatment to two situations in which the investments or
returns of nationals or companies of either signatory can sustain
losses: (1) war or other armed conflict between the host country and
a third country and (2) civil disturbance or insurrection in the host
country.9' Applying these standards, the treaty provides that the
damaged party shall be entitled to "restitution, indemnification,
compensation or other appropriate settlement" and shall receive
"treatment no less favorable than that which such other party
accords to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or compa-
nies of any third country, whichever is most favorable. '92
85. Id See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Other BITs have stated this prin-
ciple in alternative fashion. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investment, July 22, 1975, United Kingdom-Singapore, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 591, art. 5,
para. 1 ("compensation shall amount to the market value of the investment expropriated
immediately before the expropriation or impending expropriation became public
knowledge").
86. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. III, para. I. The United States-
Egypt BIT also emphasizes that the right to compensation extends to the expropriation of
any direct or indirect ownership or other rights "with respect to the equity" held by
nationals or companies of either party in an investment expropriated by the other party.
Id at art. III, para. 2.
87. Id at art. III, para. 1.
88. Id at art. III, para. 3.
89. Id
90. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. IV.
91. Id
92. Id This principle has been incorporated into other recent BITs. See, e.g., Japan-
Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 20, at art. 6.
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D. TRANSFER OF INVESTMENT PROCEEDS AND OTHER FUNDS
In Article V of the United States-Egypt BIT, the two signatories
agreed to allow nationals or companies of the other party to transfer
freely investment-related proceeds and other funds.93 Although such
transfer provisions are a typical and vital feature of investment trea-
ties, the United States-Egypt BIT has substantially more detail than
most treaties.94 For example, it guarantees that when arrangements
regarding the type of currency to be used in a transfer are not made
in advance, transfers can be made in the currency of the original
investment or in "any other freely convertible currency" and at the
prevailing rate of exchange on the date of transfer.95
93. These proceeds and other funds include:
a. returns.
b. royalties and other payments deriving from licenses, franchises and other
similar grants or rights.
c. installments in repayment of loans.
d. amounts spent for the management of the investment in the territory of the
other Party or a third country.
e. additional funds necessary for the maintenance of the investment.
f. the proceeds of partial or total sale or liquidation of the investment, includ-
ing a liquidation effected as a result of any event mentioned in Article IV;
and
g. compensation payments pursuant to Article III.
United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 1.
Notwithstanding the agreement to allow the free transfer of proceeds and other funds,
the United States and Egypt recognized that Egypt may "find its foreign exchange
reserves at a very low level," thereby necessitating "temporary" delays in transfers. Such
delays are permitted only "(i) in a manner not less favorable than that accorded to com-
parable transfers to investors of third countries; (ii) to the extent and for the time period
necessary to restore its reserves to a minimally acceptable level, but in no case for periods
of time longer than that permitted by. . . [Egyptian domestic law]. . . in force on the
date of signature of. . . the Treaty; and (iii) after providing the investor an opportunity
to invest the sales or liquidation proceeds in a manner which will preserve their real
value free of exchange risk until the transfer occurs." Id at Protocol, para. 7.
94. In their recently signed BIT, Japan and Sri Lanka agreed to guarantee the "free-
dom of payments, remittances, and transfers of financial instruments or funds including
value of liquidation of an investment." Japan-Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 20, at art. 8,
para. 1. See also Philippines-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. VII. However,
in another recent investment agreement, Sweden and the People's Republic of China
agreed upon an unusually detailed provision:
Each Contracting State shall, subject to its laws and regulations, allow without
undue delay the transfer in any convertible currency of:
a. the net profits, dividends, royalties, technical assistance and technical serv-
ice fees, interest and other current income, accruing from any investment
by an investor of the other Contracting State;
b. the proceeds of the total or partial liquidation of any investment by an
investor of the other Contracting State;
c. funds in repayment of borrowings which both contracting States have rec-
ognized as investment; and
d. the earnings of nationals of the other Contracting State who are allowed to
work in connection with an investment in its territory.
Mutual Protection Treaty, supra note 35, at art. 4.
95. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 2.
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Under early agreements, repatriation of investment proceeds
proved to be a problematic issue. The Andean Foreign Investment
Code, for example, limited the repatriation of annual profits to a
fixed percentage.96 Even though the United States-Egypt BIT
insures that monetary transfers can occur without such harsh restric-
tions, it does permit the parties to maintain laws and regulations that
require reports of currency transfers and that allow the collection of
income taxes through the imposition of withholding taxes on divi-
dends and other transfers.97 In addition, the Treaty allows the par-
ties to preserve the rights of creditors through "the equitable,
nondiscriminatory and good faith application" of their laws.98
E. CONSULTATIONS
The United States-Egypt BIT provides for biennial consulta-
tions between the parties for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty's
operation.99 Such consultations "should aim at exchanging informa-
tion and views on the progress regarding investments."1 00 Further-
more, the Treaty allows either party to make a written request for
additional consultations to discuss the application of the Treaty or
the resolution of disputes arising thereunder.' 0 l These supplemental
consultations "seek to avoid the adverse effects" of the host country's
laws, regulations, decisions, administrative practices, or policies
upon the activities of the other party's investors. 0 2 Where a party,
on behalf of its nationals or companies, requests investment infor-
mation from the second party, the BIT provides that the second
country shall, "consistent with the applicable laws and regulations
and with due regard for business confidentiality, endeavor to estab-
lish appropriate procedures and arrangements for the provision of
any such information."' 10 3
96. Specifically, the Andean Code restricts the annual repatriation of profit from
Andean Commission [ANCOM] countries to 14 percent of the value of the foreign enter-
prise. Andean Foreign Investment Code, June 30, 1971, art. 37, reprinted in II I.L.M.
126, 138.
97. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 3.
98. Id
99. id at art. VI, para. 2. Interestingly, the Model BIT does not provide for biennial
or other regular consultations.
100. id
101. Id at art. VI, para. 1. Dispute settlement procedures are specifically addressed in
Article VII of the United States-Egypt BIT. See infra notes 104-32 and accompanying
text.
102. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VI, para. 1.
103. Id at art. VI, para. 3.
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F. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
From the investor's perspective, one of the most important
aspects of the United States-Egypt BIT is its dispute resolution pro-
cedures.'0 4 The Treaty divides disputes into "legal investment dis-
putes"1 05 and disputes between the parties concerning the Treaty's
interpretation. 106 This distinction not only mirrors the pattern gen-
erally established in bilateral agreements utilized by several OECD
nations, but also reflects the practical distinction inherent in dis-
agreements between governments and disagreements between a pri-
vate party and a government.
. Investment Disputes
Article VII of the United States-Egypt BIT states that an invest-
ment dispute involves either "the interpretation or application of an
'investment agreement between a party and a national or company of
the other party" or "an alleged breach of any right conferred or cre-
ated by [the] treaty with respect to an investment."1 0 7 When this
type of dispute arises, the BIT directs the parties initially to seek a
resolution through consultation and negotiation, including the use of
nonbinding third-party procedures.108
In cases where consultation or negotiation fails the Treaty man-
dates that the investment dispute be settled in accordance with the
applicable procedures set forth in the investment agreement between
the investor and host government.1°9 This same procedure also
applies to an expropriation dispute and may be enforced "in accord-
ance with the terms of the investment agreement and relevant provi-
104. Id at art. VII & art. VIII. Dispute settlement in the intergovernmental arena has
been a problematic issue for trading nations and has been the focus of substantial debate
and effort in recent years. See, e.g., Hudec, G4YT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo
Round- An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980); deKieffer, GAT
Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law, 2 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 317 (1980).
105. See infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
107. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. VH, para. 1. The Model BIT con-
tains a broader definition of an "investment dispute." It not only incorporates the United
States-Egypt BIT's definition into its provisions but also states that the term "investment
dispute" means "the interpretation or application of any investment authorization
granted by [a] foreign investment authority" to a national or company of a Party. Model
BIT, supra note 7, at art. VII, para. 1.
Under the terms of the United States-Egypt BIT, the dispute settlement procedures do
not apply to disputes arising under "an official export credit, guarantee or insurance
agreement" if the parties have agreed to other settlement procedures. United States-
Egypt BIT, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 6. The Model BIT contains similar exemptions
but also makes specific reference to the Export-Import Bank of the United States. See
Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. VII, para. 6.
108. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 2.
109. Id
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sions of [the host country's] domestic law."' "10 As an alternative to
reliance on investment agreement provisions, the parties can refer to
treaties and other international agreements that the host country has
signed and that deal with the enforcement of arbitral awards. "
Under the United States-Egypt BIT, a national or company has
the right to resort to third-party arbitration or conciliation if the pro-
cedures described above fail to resolve the investment dispute." 2
Specifically, the Treaty provides that investors may submit the dis-
pute to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID)"I3 if, within six months of the date upon which
the dispute occurred, at least one of the following three events takes
place:
(i) the dispute has not been settled through consultation and negotiation;
or
(ii) the dispute has not, for any good reason, been submitted for resolution
in accordance with any applicable dispute-settlement procedures previ-
ously agreed to by the parties to the dispute; or
(iii) the national or company concerned has not brought the dispute before
the courts of justice or administrative tribunals or agencies of the host
country. 114
Once a dispute has been submitted to the ICSID, the BIT mandates
settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States" 5 and the applicable rules and regulations of the
ICSID.116
110. Id
111. Id
112. See generally id at para. 3.
113. In 1966 the World Bank created the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes to encourage private foreign investment. See Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened
for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090. The ICSID maintains
panels of arbitrators and conciliators to help resolve disputes between governments and
foreign investors. To participate in the ICSID, a country must belong to the World
Bank.
114. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. VII, para. 3. The Model BIT does
not provide that the dispute may be submitted to the ICSID if the parties cannot settle
their dispute through consultation and negotiation. The absence of this provision from
the Model, however, is unimportant because it is unlikely that an investor will submit a
dispute to the ICSID if the dispute has already been settled through consultation and
negotiation. See Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. VII, para. 3.
Under both the United States-Egypt BIT and the Model BIT, the parties have officially
consented to the submission of any legal investment dispute to the ICSID for settlement
by conciliation or binding arbitration. See id at para. 3(b); United States-Egypt BIT,
supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 3(b).
115. See supra note 113.
116. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. VII, para. 3(c). See ICSID REGU-
LATIONS AND RULES, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 351-91 (1968) (these rules and regulations,
which took effect on January 1, 1968, help the ICSID resolve disputes more efficiently).
Although the ICSID often functions as an arbitrator in BIT disputes, treaty provisions
may alter this procedure. In the United States-Panama BIT, for example, the parties
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In a judicial, arbitral, or other proceeding involving an invest-
ment dispute between the host country and an investor of the other
party, the host country cannot assert as a defense, counter-claim, or
right of set-off that the particular investor "has received, or will
receive, pursuant to an insurance contract, indemnification or other
compensation for all or part of its alleged damages" from any third
party, including the host country. 17 An investor, nevertheless,
"shall not be entitled to compensation for more than the value of its
affected assets, taking into account all sources of compensation
within the territory of the [p]arty liable for compensation."' 18
The above dispute settlement procedures generally contain
more detail than those utilized in the BITs between industrial and
developing nations. In the Philippines-United Kingdom BIT, for
example, the parties agreed that they must assent to a request by an
investor of the other party to submit "for conciliation or arbitration"
to the ICSID "any dispute that may arise in connection with the
investment." '"19 Article 8 of the BIT between the United Kingdom
and Sri Lanka provides a typical example of this type of
requirement:
Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit to the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. . . for settlement by con-
ciliation or arbitration under the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States opened for
signature at Washington 18 March 1965 any legal disputes arising between
that Contracting Party and a national or company of the other Contracting
Party concerning an investment of the latter in the territory of the former.'
2 0
designated the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission as a possible arbi-
tration panel. United States-Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII, para. 2.
117. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 4. This supplemental
compensation provision reflects the policy expressed in most BITs. The BIT between Sri
Lanka and the United Kingdom, for example, provides that a party to the Treaty "shall
not raise as an objection at any stage of the proceedings. . . the fact that the national or
company which is the other Party to the dispute has received in pursuance of an insur-
ance contract an indemnity in respect of some or all of his or its losses." Sri Lanka-
United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. 8, para. 3.
Significantly, the United States-Egypt BIT fails to address the validity of rights
assigned pursuant to an indemnity. BITs signed by other nations do address this subject.
The Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT, for example, provides that each party shall recog-
nize the assignment of rights to the other party by an investor pursuant to an indemnity
given to that investor for losses in the territory of the first party. Under this BIT, the
second party shall be "entitled by virtue of subrogation to exercise the rights and enforce
the claims" of such an investor provided that such party "shall not be entitled . . . to
exercise any rights other than such rights as the national or company [i.e. the investor]
would have been entitled to exercise." Id at art. 10.
118. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. VII, para. 4.
119. Philippines-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. X.
120. Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. 8, para. 1. See also Japan-
Sri Lanka BIT, supra note 20, at art. II; Sri-Lanka-Switzerland BIT, supra note 50, at art.
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As in the United States-Egypt BIT, the aforementioned agreement
also stipulates an initial period for informal dispute settlement
"through local remedies or otherwise."' 21
2. Disputes between the Parties
As is typical of most BITs, the United States-Egypt BIT com-
mits the parties to employ diplomatic channels to resolve any dispute
between them regarding the interpretation or application of the
treaty.1' Should such diplomatic efforts fail, the BIT provides that
the dispute shall, upon agreement of the parties, be submitted to the
International Court of Justice. 23 This option, not typically found in
other BITs, establishes an additional alternative for dispute resolu-
tion by providing recourse beyond diplomacy or unilaterally-
imposed arbitration. 24
In the absence of an agreement to submit a dispute to the Inter-
national Court of Justice and upon written request by either party,
the BIT provides for the dispute to be submitted to binding arbitra-
tion.125 As in many BITs entered into by other industrial nations,126
the arbitration must be conducted by a tripartite tribunal in accord-
ance with principles of international law. 127 The tribunal must con-
sist of a chairman-someone who is not a national of either party-
and two other arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties.128
121. Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. 8, para. 3 (providing a
three month informal settlement period).
122. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, para. 1. As with legal invest-
ment disputes, the BIT provisions concerning disputes between the parties do not apply
to disputes arising under "an official export credit, guarantee or insurance arrangement,
pursuant to which the Parties have agreed to other means of settling disputes." Id at
para. 4.
123. Id at para. 2.
124. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
125. Id at para. 3(a). This provision states that if the parties do not agree to submit
the dispute to the International Court of Justice, "the dispute shall, upon written request
of either Party, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal for binding decision in accordance
with applicable rules and principles of international law." Id
126. See, e.g., Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. 9; Philippines-
United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. XI; Mutual Protection Treaty, supra note 35,
at art. 6.
127. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, para. 3(a)-(b).
128. Id at para. 3(b): Each party must appoint an arbitrator within 60 days after
arbitration is requested. These two arbitrators must in turn select a third arbitrator to
serve as chairman. This latter decision must be made within 90 days after the initial
arbitration request. Id See also United States-Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VIII,
para. 3 (providing that the Chairman must be appointed within two months after the
selection of the other two arbitrators). If the appointments are not made within the
ninety-day period, either party may request the President of the International Court of
Justice to make the appointment. If the President is a national of either party or is
unable to act for any reason, the Court's Vice President will be asked to make the
appointment. If, for any reason, the Vice President cannot make the decision, the Court's
next most senior member will be asked to appoint the Chairman. United States-Egypt
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Should any arbitrator be unable to perform his duties, the Treaty
provides that a replacement shall be appointed within thirty days of
the determination of such disability and by the same procedure used
to appoint the original arbitrator.129
With a specificity lacking in most OECD BITs, the United
States-Egypt BIT calls for sharply expedited arbitration proceedings.
Unless the parties otherwise agree, they must file all submissions and
complete all hearings before the arbitration tribunal within 120 days
of the appointment of the full tribunal.130 Furthermore, the tribunal
must reach its decision within thirty days of the last day of hearings
or of the filing of final submissions, whichever is later.' 31 The tribu-
nal's final decision must be determined by majority vote and, unless
the parties otherwise agree, must be in accord with the Model Rules
on Arbitral Procedure adopted by the United Nations International
Law Commission. 132
G. PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS
By its own terms, the United States-Egypt BIT does not super-
sede, prejudice, or otherwise derogate from fundamental categories
of rights and obligations. 133 Additionally, it allows the parties com-
BIT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, para. 3(c). The costs incurred by the Chairman are shared
equally by the parties. Id at para. 3(g). See also United States-Panama BIT, supra note
2, at art. VIII, para. 7 (providing for a similar apportionment of expenses, but also stating
that the tribunal may, at its discretion, order that one of the Parties pay a higher
proportion).
129. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, para. 3(d). If a replacement is
not appointed within the requisite time period, either party may invite the President of
the International Court of Justice to make the appointment in the same manner as the
original appointment of tribunal members. ld See supra note 128.
130. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, para. 3(e).
131. Id Under the Model BIT and the United States-Panama BIT, submissions must
be made and hearings must be concluded within six months of the Chairman's selection.
In addition, under both treaties the tribunal must make a decision within two months of
the date of the final submissions or the date of the closing of the hearings, whichever is
later. Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. VIII, para. 6.; United States-Panama BIT, supra
note 2, at art. VIII, para. 6.
132. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. VIII, para. 3(f).
133. The United States-Egypt BIT specifically states:
1. This Treaty shall not supersede, prejudice, or otherwise derogate from
(a) laws, regulations, administrative practices or procedures, or adjudicatory
decisions of either Party, (b) international legal obligations, or (c) obligations
assumed by either Party, including those contained in an investment agreement
or an investment authorization, whether extant at the time of entry into force of
this Treaty or thereafter, that entitle investments or associated activities of
nationals or companies of the other Party to treatment more favorable than that
accorded by this Treaty in like situations.
United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. IX, para. 1. In addition, the BIT states that
it "shall not derogate from or terminate any other agreement entered into by the two
Parties and in force as between the two Parties on the date on which the Treaty enters
into force." Id at para. 2.
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plete latitude in prescribing organizational, registrational, and other
investment formalities, provided that they do not "impair the sub-
stance of any of the rights" established by the BIT.1 34 Moreover, the
Treaty specifically emphasizes that it does not preclude the parties
and their political or administrative subdivisions from applying "any
and all measures necessary for the maintenance of public order and
morals," fulfilling existing international obligations, protecting their
security interests, and taking other measures deemed appropriate to
satisfy future international obligations.135
H. TAXATION
The Treaty does not establish separate tax treatment for invest-
ments falling within its provisions:1 36 "all matters relating to the tax-
ation of nationals or companies of a Party, or their investments in
the territories of the other Party or a political or administrative sub-
division thereof shall be excluded". 137 Instead, the parties agree to
"strive to accord fairness and equity in the treatment of investments
of nationals or companies of the other Party" under their respective
tax policies.138 Of course, this provision is subject to the Treaty's
basic provisions dealing with fair compensation for expropriations
and free funds transfers.139
I. DURATION AND TERMINATION
The Treaty remains in force for an initial ten-year period and
continues thereafter unless terminated by either the United States or
Egypt. 40 Termination at the end of the initial period or any time
thereafter is effected by either party giving one year's written
notice. 141 Even after termination, however, the Treaty's provisions
will continue to apply to and protect any investments made or
acquired prior to the termination date for an additional ten-year
period after that date. 142 This provision, which essentially extends
the Treaty to a twenty-year period, is necessary to establish the
security needed by investors and is a feature common to BITs uti-
134. Id at art. X, para. 2.
135. Id. at art. X, para. 1.
136. See id at art. XI.
137. Id
138. Id
139. The exclusion of tax matters is a common feature of OECD treaties. See, e.g., Sri
Lanka-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. 7; Philippines-United Kingdom BIT,
supra note 19, at art. IV. The exclusion reflects the desire of most nations to preserve the
flexibility and applicability of their own tax laws. Including tax matters in a BIT defeats
the goal of establishing a relatively simple framework for investment.
140. United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. XIII, para. 2.
141. Id at para. 3.
142. Id at para. 4.
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lized by other countries.143
III
THE BIT CONCEPT: A NUMBER OF CURABLE
PROBLEMS
By adopting the BIT concept, the United States has undoubt-
edly enhanced the overseas investment opportunities available to its
investors. Thus, it follows that the United States should enter into
many more BITs. Successful negotiation of these treaties, however,
will not be accomplished without some difficulty. Experience with
Egypt demonstrates that pressures will invariably arise requiring
departure from the Model BIT. 1" Of course, in some circumstances,
adaptations are not only inevitable but desirable. Despite this fact,
the United States should not forget that BITs should be simple and
straightforward. Indeed, this type of treaty evolved because of the
complexities and broad scope of its predecessor, the FCN treaty.145
Besides the general problem just noted, BITs have a number of
specific deficiencies, as illustrated by the United States-Egypt BIT.
First, the "limited exceptions" provisions of the treaty emasculate
the national treatment standard."'6 These provisions effectively
restrict investment in a number of important business sectors in the
United States and Egypt. 47 In the future, the demand for limited
exception provisions will pose significant problems for United States
treaty negotiators. Exceptions provide a vehicle through which par-
ties to a treaty can compromise and effect agreement. They also,
however, restrict severely investment opportunities, impinge on basic
BIT principles, and reduce the BIT's overall attractiveness.
To solve the "exceptions" problem, negotiators should refrain
from including sweeping, industry-wide exceptions in a treaty.
Instead, they should 'carefully examine the relevant policies and
explore the alternative methods of effectuating them. The use of spe-
cific references to existing legal restrictions may, for example, pro-
vide a viable and less damaging alternative to broad industry
143. See, e.g., Philippines-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. XII (providing
a supplemental ten-year effective period after termination); Japan-Sri Lanka BIT, supra
note 20, at art. 16 (providing a fifteen-year supplemental effective period after termina-
tion); Mutual Protection Treaty, supra note 35, at art. 1 (providing a fifteen-year supple-
mental effective period after termination); Sri Lanka-Switzerland BIT, supra note 50, at
art. 12 (providing a ten-year supplemental effective period after termination).
144. See supra notes 27-29. These notes demonstrate some of the differences between
the United States-Egypt BIT and the most recent Model BIT.
145. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 48-49.
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exceptions.148 Where industry-wide exceptions are necessary, this
approach obviously will not work. In these situations, treaty negoti-
ators must carefully draft pertinent provisions. Unfortunately, the
American and Egyptian negotiators failed to do this. As a result, the
United States-Egypt BIT contains a number of poorly drafted provi-
sions. 149 The ambiguous phrasing of Egypt's reservation of "com-
mercial activity such as distribution, wholesaling, retailing, [and]
import and export activities", 50 for example, might dissuade poten-
tial investors from pursuing worthwhile investment opportunities,
notwithstanding the exception to this provision enunciated in the
Treaty's Protocol dealing with operations combining "production
and sales activities."''
Second, the United States-Egypt BIT fails to guard adequately
against discriminatory actions taken by the host country against
investors of the other party. As noted previously, early drafts of the
Treaty contained a provision which enjoined a party from
"impair[ing] by arbitrary and discriminatory measures the manage-
ment, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expan-
sion or disposal of investment made by nationals or companies of the
other Party."152 Surprisingly, the final draft of the Treaty did not
include this or similar language. Although one can argue that this
language simply underscores the national treatment standard and
thus adds no new protections, the deletion cannot be justified. The
deleted provision safeguards against the type of subtle interference
which, over the years, has discouraged persons from investing in
developing countries. 5 3 More importantly, it provides a valuable
148. See, e.g., Mineral Lands Leasing Act, Pub. L. No. 66-146, 41 Stat. 437 (1920)
(current version at 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This Act, which prohibits
aliens from entering mineral leases upon public lands, is illustrative of the kind of nar-
row exceptions the United States might want to include in a future BIT. If the United
States adopts "the existing legal restrictions" approach, future BITs would have to con-
tain a provision whereby the United States and the other signatory agree to notify each
other immediately after their respective legislative bodies promulgate relevant restric-
tions. This approach would be more precise and unequivocal than the approach cur-
rently taken for "exceptions."
149. See United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 3; id at Annex.
150. Id
151. Specifically, the Protocol states that "[w]ith regard to the Annex, the exceptions
noted by the Arab Republic of Egypt under 'commercial activity' do not include inte-
grated operations which combine production and sales activities for their products." Id
at Protocol, para. 7. Clearly, careful drafting would have obviated the need for this sup-
plemental qualification.
152. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
153. See Voss, The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Develop-
ing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 686, 702-
05 (1982). Subtle interference can take two basic forms. First, it can deal with the sub-
stance of an investor's property rights. This type of interference takes the form of tax or
administrative laws and includes: "prohibitive taxation of profits, interest income, and
revenue from licenses; forced sales of majority interests to local partners or employees;
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assurance to the investor. Thus, from the perspective of signatories,
it is difficult to understand why they would consider the deleted lan-
guage to be undesirable.
Third, many of the terms used in the United States-Egypt BIT
are ambiguous. 154 Future BITS should clarify, for example, the
meaning of the term "substantial interest" as used in the definition of
"company of a Party."' 55 The Model BIT and the United States-
Panama BIT attempt to solve this problem by providing that this
interest shall be determined by the concerned party. 56 An even
more precise definition, however, would be desirable. To accom-
plish this task, future treaties could define "substantial interest" as a
percentage of equity. Such a definition would reduce or even elimi-
nate any ambiguities associated with that term.
Other terms used in the United States-Egypt BIT are also
ambiguous. 5 7 Because of the geographic diversity of the countries
involved in negotiating BITs, and because of the interest of investors
in offshore areas, "territory"' 5 8 is the term that most needs clarifica-
tion. The Model BIT attempts to clarify the meaning of this term by
stating:
The treatment accorded by a Party to nationals or companies of the
other Party under the provisions of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall in
any State, Territory, possession, or political or administrative subdivision of
the Party be the treatment accorded therein to companies incorporated, con-
stituted or otherwise duly organized in other States, Territories, possessions,
depriving the investor of his management rights flowing from his equity holdings (e.g.,
by appointing government inspectors); indirect transfer restrictions by means of transfer
delays by central banks." Id at 702. Second, it can interfere with the "functional prop-
erty" rights of the investor. This type of interference deals with an enterprise's ability to
operate at a profit and includes restrictions in the following areas: (1) raw materials
acquisition; (2) production processes and quantities; (3) labor (ie. hiring and firing of
employees, hiring of local persons for managerial positions, etc.); (4) pricing; and
(5) finance (ie. exclusion from local capital market). Id at 702.
154. See, e.g., United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. I, para. l(b) ("substantial
interest"); id at art. 1, para. l(d) ("own or control"); id at para. l(e) ("national"); id at
art. II ("territory").
155. The relevant provision in the United States-Egypt BIT states:
"company of a Party" means a company duly incorporated, constituted, or
otherwise duly organized under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party or
a political or administrative subdivision thereof in which
(i) natural persons who are nationals of such Party, or
(ii) such Party or a political or administrative subdivision thereof or their
agencies or instrumentalities
have a substantial interest.
United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 1(b).
156. Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. I, para. l(b); United States-Panama BIT, supra
note 2, at art. I, para. l(b).
157. See supra note 154.
158. The United States-Egypt BIT refers to the term "territory" a number of times.
See, for example, Article II, para. 2(a), supra note 37.
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or political or administrative subdivisions of the Party.' 5 9
Unfortunately, the United States-Egypt BIT contains no such provi-
sion. And it is not clear whether future BITs entered into by the
United States will contain a similar provision.
Fourth, the provisions dealing with compensation for expropri-
ation need to be refined. 160 Because of the volatile circumstances
surrounding many expropriations, BITs should clearly and strongly
state the terms of compensation. To accomplish this task, future
treaties should provide that the minimum compensation level equals
the replacement value of the assets. Inclusion of such a provision
would add considerable precision to the "fair market value" com-
pensation standard employed by Article III of the United States-
Egypt BIT. 161
The form of compensation is another aspect of Article III com-
pensation which concerns investors. 162 The requirements that expro-
priation payments be made without delay and be "freely
transferable" are sound provisions which track the language of most
other OECD treaties.' 63 Nonetheless, this requirement falls short of
the one guarantee most investors seek-immediate compensation in
the currency of the investor's home country.164 In this regard, one
can think of a number of scenarios that worry investors. Cata-
159. Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. II, para. 10.
160. See United States-Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. III.
161. With regard to compensation, the United States-Egypt BIT provides:
[c]ompensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment on the date of expropriation. The calculation of such compensation
shall not reflect any reduction in such fair market value due to either prior public
notice or announcement of the expropriatory action, or the occurence of the
events that constituted or resulted in the expropriatory action.
Id at art. III, para. 1.
162. The United States-Egypt BIT states that "compensation shall include payments
for delay as may be considered appropriate under international law, and shall be freely
transferable at the prevailing rate of exchange for current transactions on the date of the
expropriatory action." Id The Model BIT, on the other hand, treats this subject with
more specificity. It states that
[s]uch compensation shall be paid without delay, shall be effectively realizable,
shall bear current interest from the date of the expropriation at a rate equivalent
to current international rates, and shall be freely transferable at the prevailing
market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.
Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. I, para. 1.
163. See, e.g., Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 19, at art. 5, para. I (pro-
viding for "prompt, adequate and effective compensation"); Mutual Protection Treaty,
supra note 35, at art. 3, para. I (compensation must be "convertible and freely
transferable").
164. The United States and Egypt agreed that currency transfers associated with com-
pensation payments shall be "in the currency of the original investment or in any other
freely convertible currency." United States-Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. V, para. 2.
Because these transfers can be "in any other freely convertible currency," an investor has
no guarantee that compensation shall be in his home country's currency. The Model BIT
treats the investor more favorably by allowing him to select the currency of the transfers
associated with the compensation payments. Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. V, para. 2.
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strophic problems would arise, for example, if compensation made
by a new, untested government took the form of thirty-year bonds
issued by that government. Such compensation probably meets the
"effective realization" and "freely transferable" compensation stan-
dards of the United States-Egypt BIT and Model BIT, but fails to
satisfy investor demands for speedy and adequate compensation. In
future BIT negotiations, negotiators should attempt to solve this
problem by providing guarantees that are less broad than the "effec-
tive realization" and "freely transferable" standards. 165
Last, the United States-Egypt BIT's dispute settlement proce-
dure has one major defect. In general, the Treaty contains typical
OECD investment treaty provisions which provide an expeditious
and sound framework for resolving disputes between the parties. 166
By using language similar to that used in other OECD treaties, how-
ever, negotiators created a procedural problem. This problem arises
from the requirement that the parties resort to the International
Court of Justice for appointment of arbitrators when the parties do
not appoint an arbitral panel within the required period. 167 Signifi-
cantly, the Treaty provides that if the President of the International
Court of Justice is a national of one of the parties or is "unable to
act," other members of the Court should act accordingly. 68 An
investor with a grievance against a party may find that this language
impedes prompt dispute resolution in situations where the President
165. Regardless of how treaty negotiators articulate the compensation standard, inves-
tors will almost always question the adequacy of expropriation compensation. To
resolve the dispute, aggrieved parties will probably employ the judicial review and dis-
pute resolution procedures provided by BITs. See United States-Egypt BIT, supra note
1, at art. VII. To be effective, however, such procedures must remain simple and
expedient.
166. Article VIII, paragraph 3 provides, in part, that
(a) In the absence of such agreement, the dispute shall, upon the written
request of either Party, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal for binding
decision in accordance with the applicable rules and principles of interna-
tional law.
(b) The Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one appointed by each
Party, and a Chairman appointed by agreement of the other two arbitrators.
The Chairman shall not be a national of either Party. Each Party shall
appoint an arbitrator within 60 days, and the Chairman shall be appointed
within 90 days, after a Party has requested arbitration of a dispute..
(c) If the periods set forth in (b) above are not met, and in the absence of some
other arrangement between the Parties, either Party may invite the Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice to make the necessary appoint-
ment. If the President is a national of either of the Parties or is unable to act
for any reason, either Party may invite the Vice President, or if he is also a
national of either Party or otherwise unable to act, the next most senior
member of the International Court of Justice, to make the appointment.
Id at para. 3(a)-(c).
167. Id at para. 3(c).
168. Id
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of the Court simply fails to act even though he is capable of acting or
is a national of a non-party. A simple modification could rectify this
procedural defect. The Treaty should state that junior members of
the Court must proceed with appointments if the President is a
national of a party, or, for whatever reason, fails to make the
required appointments within a set period of time. Such a change
would not only eliminate the problem of non-action by the President
of the Court, but also enhance the spirit of promptness that pervades
the BIT dispute settlement process.
In sum, the United States-Egypt BIT contains a number of defi-
ciencies. These deficiencies, however, can be rectified with a mini-
mal amount of effort. Negotiators of future BITs should implement
solutions to these problems. At the same time, they should keep
BITs simple and concise. In this way, the treaties can best serve the
interests of both the parties and their investors.
CONCLUSION
BITs are simple and concise documents that provide numerous
protections to United States investors desiring to invest in develop-
ing countries. 169 Because investors perceive investment security as
the principal purpose of an investment treaty, the United States'
efforts to enter into more BITs should lead to a significant increase in
the number of overseas investments made by American investors.
Although no bilateral treaty can assure protection from the inherent
instability of many developing nations, BITs have adequately pro-
tected the investments of OECD countries in such nations.170 More-
over, BITs have worked effectively in expropriation situations.' 7' As
a result, these treaties should be employed frequently in the future
by the United States' foreign policy makers.
Clearly, the BIT represents an important step in protecting
overseas investments. This type of treaty, however, cannot solve all
of the United States' foreign investment problems. Indeed, the
United States-Egypt BIT has a number of faults which should be
eliminated in future treaties. 72 Unquestionably, the most important
of these problems is the deviation by the United States and Egypt
from the Model BIT. 173 Although flexibility is an important aspect
of successful treaty negotiations, negotiators should avoid substan-
tially changing the Model every time they approach the bargaining
169. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
171. Id
172. See supra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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table simply because a party wants to protect a limited special inter-
est. The purpose of the BIT is to provide a straightforward, concise,
and uniform vehicle for investment security. It is in the interest of
both the United States and its prospective BIT partners to avoid
assiduously major changes of the Model which would defeat that
purpose and would derogate from the BIT's role of protecting
United States investors and their foreign counterparts.

